# kaal:claim:3808859-021

**Claim.** An optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool would make separation movements in open source less likely, because voters who know the process rewards truth-seeking are more likely to accept an adverse outcome; emerging decentralization technology makes such a tool theoretically feasible.

**Type.** design  **Support.** speculative

**Holds when.**

- conditional on incentive-optimal voting mechanisms being buildable

**Source quote.**

> Perhaps if the open source movement had an optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool, such separation of interests and development would become less likely.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades* (2021), IV.4 Shortcomings, page 33

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralization%20%E2%80%93%20Why%20We%20Need%20Technology%20Infrastructure%20Upgrades.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, risk-and-incentives, open-source-and-code

**Keywords.** governance, voting-mechanisms, incentive-design, open-source

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