# kaal:claim:3808867-013

**Claim.** Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcomes reflecting the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- representative democracies

**Source quote.**

> Voted representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents but for maintaining their own power of office.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI* (2021), III. Technological Microdemocracy, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `eeccf6d0587bd278a96ce6ac8ec5003e26d161c245f6c94b4144d84f374802eb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20Decentralized%20Systems%20Can%20Upgrade%20AI.pdf

**Failure mode.** Representative incentive misalignment  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, ai-and-agents, corporate-governance, governance-design

**Keywords.** representative-democracy, incentive-design, principal-agent, voting

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.