# kaal:claim:3808873-018

**Claim.** Overreliance on the design of constitutional democracies limits experimentation with decentralized solutions for organizing society, because exclusive reliance on a single legal document combined with widespread voter apathy makes the constitutional model appear to be the only lasting form of organization.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- constitutional democracies as the dominant form of organizing society

**Source quote.**

> Overreliance on the design of constitutional democracies limits experimentation with decentralized solutions for the organization of society.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralization Neutralizers* (2021), V. Constitutional Democracies, page 13

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `f11493915e6b8c266d421510b5546816e33defb5650aac9d09b20d78549da727` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralization%20Neutralizers.pdf

**Failure mode.** Constitutional Exclusivity Lock In  (family: innovation-chilling)

**Topics.** governance-design

**Keywords.** constitutional-democracy, governance-experimentation, voter-apathy, societal-organization

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