# kaal:claim:3931933-038

**Claim.** Governance decisions such as network upgrades follow a simple vote that mints no reputation, yet reputation in the SDAO can still be lost through a governance vote because each vote follows the DEVxDAO MVPR logic moving from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- SDAO governance votes on network upgrades

**Source quote.**

> Governance decisions, such as network upgrades, among others, follow a simple vote process in which no reputation is minted. However, reputation in the SDAO can be lost as a result of a governance vote as each vote follows the DEVxDAO MVPR logic via loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake* (2021), Toy Model, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Hybrid%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, reputation

**Keywords.** sdao, governance-voting, reputation-loss, mvpr-protocol, coupled-voting

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-030
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-018

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.