# kaal:claim:3949098-011

**Claim.** The delayed voting outcomes and feedback effects created by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting let DAOIC members triangulate their own internal liquidity position against deal feasibility.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- two phase loosely coupled and tightly coupled reputation staking votes

**Source quote.**

> At the same time, the delayed voting outcomes and associated feedback effects enabled by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting enable DAOIC members to triangulate their own internal liquidity with deal feasibility.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance* (2021), II. Basic Concept, 2. Liquidity, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Reputation%20as%20Capital%20%E2%80%93%20How%20DAOs%20Upgrade%20Finance.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, institutional-design, defi

**Keywords.** loosely-coupled-voting, tightly-coupled-voting, feedback-effects, liquidity, governance

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-030

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.