# kaal:claim:3949098-021

**Claim.** Traditional underwriting also fails at the agent level, because individual agents within an underwriter may sacrifice the underwriter's overall reputation for personal gain, for example by putting out a fraudulent offering.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- traditional underwriting firms where agent and firm incentives diverge

**Source quote.**

> individual agents within an underwriter may decide to sacrifice the underwriter's overall reputation for personal gain.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance* (2021), II. Basic Concept, 4. Decentralized Underwriting, page 13

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Reputation%20as%20Capital%20%E2%80%93%20How%20DAOs%20Upgrade%20Finance.pdf

**Failure mode.** Agent Expropriation Of Firm Reputation  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** corporate-governance, defi, reputation, ai-and-agents

**Keywords.** agency-costs, underwriting, fraud, reputation, principal-agent

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.