# kaal:claim:3949098-022

**Claim.** In the theoretical model, the incentive design of decentralized reputation staking governance aligns the individual with the group so tightly that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of the principal.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- theoretical model
- adoption of the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms

**Source quote.**

> aligns the interests of the individual with the interest of the group. In other words, the incentives of the principal, e.g. the group, and the individual are aligned so much that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of the principal.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance* (2021), II. Basic Concept, 4. Decentralized Underwriting, page 14

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Reputation%20as%20Capital%20%E2%80%93%20How%20DAOs%20Upgrade%20Finance.pdf

**Topics.** ai-and-agents, risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, decentralization, governance-design, defi

**Keywords.** incentive-alignment, principal-agent, decentralized-governance, underwriting

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-004
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-005

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.