# kaal:claim:3949098-034

**Claim.** Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- loosely coupled votes on particular deals are publicly visible

**Source quote.**

> However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance* (2021), IV. Policy Considerations, 1. Standard Setting, page 28

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Reputation%20as%20Capital%20%E2%80%93%20How%20DAOs%20Upgrade%20Finance.pdf

**Topics.** disclosure, governance-design

**Keywords.** conflicts-of-interest, transparency, voting, insider-advantage, governance

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-018
- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-030

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.