# kaal:claim:3962614-010

**Claim.** Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- post investment stage of a VC financing

**Source quote.**

> Finally, significant information asymmetries can lead managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu* (2021), II.1.c) Cost of Deal Screening and Structuring, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20REPUTATION%20AS%20CAPITAL%20%E2%80%93%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Address%20Shortcomings%20in%20the%20Ventu.pdf

**Failure mode.** Post investment managerial opportunism  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** disclosure, corporate-governance, innovation

**Keywords.** information-asymmetry, opportunism, agency-costs, venture-capital

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-007

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