# kaal:claim:3962614-018

**Claim.** Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds because startups are incentivized to self censor when engaging with VCs, having little data to work with and being reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- early round engagement between startups and VCs

**Source quote.**

> Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds as startups are incentivized to self-censor when engaging with VCs, as they have little data to work with, and are reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu* (2021), III. Alternative Early Round Funding Mechanisms, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20REPUTATION%20AS%20CAPITAL%20%E2%80%93%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Address%20Shortcomings%20in%20the%20Ventu.pdf

**Failure mode.** Startup self censorship  (family: information-asymmetry)

**Topics.** disclosure, innovation

**Keywords.** information-asymmetry, self-censorship, startup-disclosure, venture-capital

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.