# kaal:claim:3962614-036

**Claim.** The incentives that undermine long term success of the hybrid model can be mitigated by mandating that staking on deals requires capital commitments, while allowing VCs to lower their capital commitments and increase their staking over time.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- hybrid VC DAO models transitioning away from capital

**Source quote.**

> It is possible to mitigate these incentives that undermine the long-term success of the system. For example, it is conceivable that staking on deals by VCs mandates capital commitments to the deals but that VCs can over time lower their capital commitments and increase their staking.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu* (2021), V.3. Hybrid VC Model with Smart Contracting, page 21

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20REPUTATION%20AS%20CAPITAL%20%E2%80%93%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Address%20Shortcomings%20in%20the%20Ventu.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, reputation

**Keywords.** incentive-design, reputation-staking, capital-commitment, mitigation

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