# kaal:claim:3981021-020

**Claim.** In contrast to existing legacy structures that incentivize delay and hoarding, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to release the endowed assets immediately once the work for the donation has been finished.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- DAO designs where community governance sets release policies

**Source quote.**

> In contrast to the existing legacy structures, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to immediately release the endowed assets if and when the work for the donation has been finished.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving* (2021), Fixing Charitable Giving, Incentive Optimization, page 22

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Optimize%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, compliance, dao

**Keywords.** incentive-design, asset-release, zombie-charities, community-audits, dao

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