# kaal:claim:3981021-033

**Claim.** The loss of opportunity from slashing a voting associate's reputation grows as the size of the network increases, because a larger network intensifies competition among associates for the reputation tokens that determine fungible salary payouts.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reputation weighted networks where salary tracks reputation

**Source quote.**

> reputation tokens to receive fungible token salaries that are paid in proportion to reputation tokens. Accordingly, in the CHARITYxDAO design, the loss of opportunity from slashing CHARITYxDAO VA reputation grows as the size of the network increases.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving* (2021), Governance, Reputation Staking for the Common Good, page 28

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Optimize%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, reputation, tokenomics

**Keywords.** slashing, network-effects, deterrence, reputation-tokens, salaries

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-034
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-036

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.