# kaal:claim:3981021-035

**Claim.** Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes credible when it is automated, and the value of a voting associate's reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in response to nefarious conduct.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- algorithmic detection and slashing of misconduct in DAO governance

**Source quote.**

> - Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes automated and therefore credible. The CHARITYxDAO reputation staking design also enhances policing and compliance. The value of CHARITYxDAO VA reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving* (2021), Governance, Reputation Staking for the Common Good, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Optimize%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, compliance

**Keywords.** automated-punishment, credibility, slashing, compliance, policing

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-038
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.