# kaal:claim:3981021-036

**Claim.** Commonly used identifiers such as social media profiles and credit scores play less of a role in the DAO voting design, and the resulting more equal distribution of power allows the inclusion of constituents who otherwise have no agency in centralized systems.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- governance designs using pseudonymous reputation rather than legacy identifiers

**Source quote.**

> play less of a role in the CHARITYxDAO voting designs. The more equal distribution of power in the CHARITYxDAO governance design allows the inclusion of constituents who otherwise have no agency in centralized systems.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving* (2021), Governance, Reputation Staking for the Common Good, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20Optimize%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** equity, anonymity, power-distribution, identifiers, inclusion

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