# kaal:claim:3995709-021

**Claim.** Cartel power undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews, leaving the public with no or very weak control over the quality of the code review services it receives.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a code review market dominated by a small number of firms

**Source quote.**

> The cartel power also undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews. As a result, the public has no or very weak control over the quality of code review services it receives.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards* (2021), No Controls, page 14

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `6d77dbfb15ee86080bfde0b98089180cabafeb6defdf0f05eaaeb3cb99871e89` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20How%20DAOs%20Optimize%20Open-Source%20Code%20Reviews%20and%20Create%20Open-Source%20Standards.pdf

**Failure mode.** cartel capture of quality controls  (family: regulatory-capture-and-incumbent-advantage)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** cartel, quality-controls, consumer-protection, failure-mode

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.