# kaal:claim:4033886-036

**Claim.** DCF appears at first glance unsuited to digital asset valuation because valuation is framed as pricing a token at a point in time, but it becomes applicable where networks return cash flows to token holders or to those who contribute work.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- networks that distribute cash flows to token holders or workers

**Source quote.**

> However, some digital asset networks do return cash flows to token holders or those who contribute work to the network. In such a case, DCF can shed light on the role of these structures in digital asset valuation.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, *Digital Asset Valuation* (2022), IV.2.b DCF, page 33

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20et%20al.%20-%202022%20-%20Digital%20Asset%20Valuation.pdf

**Topics.** tokenomics, economics

**Keywords.** discounted-cash-flow, token-cash-flows, network-valuation, digital-assets

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.