# kaal:claim:4529715-039

**Claim.** Big Green DAO's committee unanimity and closed membership make attacks unlikely, but these same protections come at the expense of the decentralized organization the founders were trying to create.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- vetted membership and unanimous committee approval

**Source quote.**

> However, these principles really limit what a DAO is supposed to be so in a way it is secure, but also at the expense of the organization they were trying to create.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, *Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis* (2023), Appendix, Charity DAOs, The Big Green DAO, page 131

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Bykowski%20-%202023%20-%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20%28DAO%29%20%E2%80%93%20A%20Market%20Meta%20Analysis.pdf

**Failure mode.** security-by-recentralization  (family: recentralization-drift)

**Topics.** dao, decentralization, consensus-and-security, governance-design

**Keywords.** dao, security-versus-decentralization, committee-governance, tradeoffs, big-green-dao

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.