# kaal:claim:4685567-013

**Claim.** Impact markets that promote retrospective funding and resale of impact carry an inherent risk of incentivizing net negative ventures, because individuals can capture the benefit of positive impacts without bearing the cost when their actions produce negative impacts.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- retrospective funding
- resale of impact permitted

**Source quote.**

> This risk stems from the potential for individuals to benefit from causing positive impacts without 46 bearing the costs if their actions result in negative impacts.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0* (2024), Social Impact Credits, page 21

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202024%20-%20Impact%20Investing%20Innovation%20-%20From%20Impact%201.0%20to%203.0.pdf

**Failure mode.** Asymmetric Payoff for Net Negative Ventures  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, economics

**Keywords.** net-negative-projects, moral-hazard, retrospective-funding, impact-markets

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.