# kaal:claim:4734750-037

**Claim.** Two sided reputation scores discipline both sides of the micro task market: workers become less likely to accept offers from low reputation requesters, and low reputation workers are less likely to be retained.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Code Review DAO* (2024), Removing Cost of Duplication, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `60eadf91c0913468505afc664c8d8d1e1673d6c5326d031ca7060addb8ab2eda` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202024%20-%20Code%20Review%20DAO.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, economics

**Keywords.** reputation, market-discipline, two-sided-markets, micro-tasks

**Related claims.**

- generalizes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-036
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-026

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.