# kaal:claim:4796714-021

**Claim.** Until the known attack vectors on decentralized autonomous organizations are solved, DAO based AI governance solutions remain suboptimal; these include Sybil attacks, tyranny of the majority, Arrow's impossibility theorem, sockpuppet attacks, and tragedy of the commons.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- describes DAOs as set up and governed in the majority of cases in 2024
- conditional on the attack vectors remaining unsolved

**Source quote.**

> Without solving these attack vectors, DAO related AI governance solutions remain suboptimal.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *AI Governance* (2024), Challenges, page 30

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202024%20-%20AI%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** unresolved DAO attack vectors  (family: consensus-and-protocol-attack)

**Topics.** dao, consensus-and-security, governance-design, risk-and-incentives, ai-and-agents

**Keywords.** dao, sybil-attack, governance-attacks, incentive-design, ai-governance

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-014
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-003

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.