# kaal:claim:4957318-011

**Claim.** Sunset provisions likely increase rents extracted by interest groups and entrench current majoritarian preferences, and they can create planning problems for both public and private actors.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- politically salient statutes subject to periodic renewal

**Source quote.**

> rather than genuine policy improvement. Sunset provisions also likely increase rents from interest groups, entrench current majoritarian preferences, which can at times produce planning conundrums for public and private actors.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance* (2024), Sunset Provisions, Critique, page 15

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `137fb77eb82111a85f0ab5581926f762a7414ae84aaf3d56e8299db670e0e0c1` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202024%20-%20The%20Future%20of%20Law%20-%20Dynamic%20Web3%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** sunset-rent-extraction  (family: regulatory-capture-and-incumbent-advantage)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** sunset-provisions, rent-seeking, interest-groups, public-choice, political-manipulation

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.