# kaal:claim:5254152-014

**Claim.** High governance scores require explicit mechanisms that prevent common governance failures, specifically the tyranny of the majority and the tragedy of the commons, such as reputation based voting, multi round voting, or incentive alignment.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- the paper's governance scoring criterion

**Source quote.**

> High scores, such as 9 or 10, indicate the presence of mechanisms to prevent common governance failures, such as the tyranny of the majority or the tragedy of the commons.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024* (2024), Scoring Methodology, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202024%20-%20DAO%20Market%20Meta%20Analysis%202024.pdf

**Failure mode.** absence of safeguards against majority tyranny and commons depletion  (family: collective-action-and-coordination-failure)

**Topics.** dao, governance-design, institutional-design

**Keywords.** dao-governance, tyranny-of-the-majority, tragedy-of-the-commons, voting-design

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-021
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-015

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.