# kaal:claim:5583610-002

**Claim.** Firms carrying fewer defensive mechanisms display higher market valuations and better operating performance, which supports dismantling entrenchment devices rather than adding to them.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- cross-sectional comparisons of U.S. firms

**Source quote.**

> Empirical analyses have shown that firms with fewer defensive mechanisms often have higher market valuations and better operating performance, thus supporting calls for dismantling entrenchment tactics.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America* (2025), 1. Introduction, page 4

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202025%20-%20Liquid%20Equity%20Rewards%20in%20Corporate%20America.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, empirical-evidence, economics

**Keywords.** empirical-governance, firm-valuation, entrenchment, defensive-mechanisms

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