# kaal:claim:5583610-024

**Claim.** Activist tactics including short selling, public media campaigns, and strategic leaks amplify stock price volatility between annual meetings, exploiting market sentiment and pushing retail holders into selling that deepens the price decline.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- intervals between annual shareholder meetings
- activist campaign underway

**Source quote.**

> Activist investors often amplify stock price volatility between annual meetings. Such stock price volatility may derive from activist investors' tactics such as short-selling, public media campaigns, or strategic leaks.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America* (2025), 5.1. Time-Weighted Rewards Between Annual Meetings, page 22

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202025%20-%20Liquid%20Equity%20Rewards%20in%20Corporate%20America.pdf

**Failure mode.** activist-induced volatility cascade  (family: short-termism)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** stock-volatility, short-selling, retail-selling, activist-tactics

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