# kaal:claim:5583610-029

**Claim.** Traditional golden leash arrangements pay activist-nominated directors and generate conflicts of interest, whereas LER offers non-transferable utility-only rewards that induce activists to withdraw nominations without any cash flowing to directors.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- settlement context with an activist investor

**Source quote.**

> Unlike traditional golden leash arrangements, which may involve financial payments to activist-nominated directors and raise conflicts of interest,116 LER offers non-transferable, utility-only voucher rewards to encourage activists to withdraw nominations

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America* (2025), 6.2. Co-Opting Activists Through Utility Rewards, page 25

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202025%20-%20Liquid%20Equity%20Rewards%20in%20Corporate%20America.pdf

**Topics.** corporate-governance

**Keywords.** golden-leash, director-independence, conflicts-of-interest, settlements

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.