# kaal:claim:5886442-024

**Claim.** Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, overestimates human computational capacity and perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design by justifying frictionless markets that never materialize in human systems.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- applies to human, non agentic strategic settings

**Source quote.**

> Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, not only overestimates human computational capacity but perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design, justifying frictionless markets that never materialize in human systems.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory* (2025), Anthropocentric Limits of Nash's Equilibrium, page 20

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202025%20-%20The%20AI-to-AI%20Economy%20and%20the%20Collapse%20of%20Anthropocentric%20Economic%20Theory.pdf

**Failure mode.** Nashian idealization  (family: research-design-limitation)

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** nash-equilibrium, game-theory, policy-design, anthropocentrism

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.