# kaal:claim:617681-004

**Claim.** Even if the ECJ has embraced the incorporation theory, Member States can still frustrate Type B regulatory competition through tax law, capital market law, listing requirements and other mechanisms, so the seat theory may retain de facto dominance.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Member States willing to use adjacent bodies of law to deter reincorporation

**Source quote.**

> tax law,16 capital market law17 and listing requirements18 or other mechanisms to frustrate Type B regulatory competition after ECJ's rulings in Centros and Inspire Art, the seat theory may continue its de facto dominance.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), A. Introduction, page 9

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Failure mode.** collateral-law-circumvention  (family: jurisdictional-conflict)

**Topics.** economics, regulatory-failure

**Keywords.** type-b-competition, regulatory-arbitrage, capital-market-law, eu-law

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.