# kaal:claim:617681-006

**Claim.** Rule switching costs for a jurisdiction are probably higher when it must make substantial new demands on its courts in addition to changing its statutes, which raises the cost of competing with a bundled corporate law product.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- jurisdictions considering changing corporate law rules to attract charters

**Source quote.**

> Most important to the analysis in this paper, these rule switching costs are probably higher if the jurisdiction has to make substantial new demands on its courts as well as make changes to its statutes.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), B.II Mobility Costs, Path Dependencies and Rule Switching Costs, page 15

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** rule-switching-costs, adjudication, bundled-product, regulatory-competition

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