# kaal:claim:617681-008

**Claim.** Regulatory competition for a bundled product of statutes plus courts is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- markets for a bundled corporate law product

**Source quote.**

> In sum, regulatory competition for a bundled product is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), B.III Type A, Type B And Unbundled Type B Regulatory Competition, page 18

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Topics.** tokenomics, risk-and-incentives, economics

**Keywords.** supply-side, barriers-to-entry, bundled-product, regulatory-competition

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