# kaal:claim:617681-009

**Claim.** A jurisdiction supplying corporate law as an unbundled statutory product faces low fixed costs, principally statute drafting, and near zero marginal costs, because additional users impose no new adjudication costs and registration costs are insignificant.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- statutes offered without adjudication by the state of incorporation

**Source quote.**

> Fixed investment would be principally in drafting statutes. Each additional user of the jurisdiction's corporate law would not impose new adjudication costs, and the cost of registering additional corporate charters are relatively insignificant.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), B.III Type A, Type B And Unbundled Type B Regulatory Competition, page 18

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Topics.** tokenomics, governance-design

**Keywords.** unbundling, marginal-cost, supply-side, corporate-charters

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