# kaal:claim:617681-017

**Claim.** Defects in a civil law jurisdiction's corporate statute, such as inadequate minority shareholder protection, are more easily fixed than defects in a judiciary that fails to apply the statute predictably and uniformly.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- civil law jurisdictions

**Source quote.**

> Problems with a civil law jurisdiction's underlying statute – for example if it gives inadequate protection for minority shareholders – are also more easily fixed than problems with a judiciary that fails to apply the statute in a predictable and uniform manner.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), D.I.2 Differences Between Common Law and Civil Law Approaches, page 26

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Topics.** corporate-governance

**Keywords.** civil-law, statutory-reform, adjudication, minority-shareholders

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