# kaal:claim:617681-024

**Claim.** If statutes are unbundled from adjudication the judicial bias problem largely disappears, because statutes are at least facially neutral and discriminatory statutes would violate the EU treaty.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- EU law, under which discriminatory national provisions violate freedom of establishment

**Source quote.**

> If on the other hand, statutes are unbundled from adjudication, this problem largely disappears because statutes are at least facially neutral

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), D.II.1 Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Information About Judicial Bias, page 29

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** judicial-bias, unbundling, facial-neutrality, eu-law

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