# kaal:claim:617681-032

**Claim.** Error correction is weak for Member State corporate law adjudication: national legislatures are unlikely to intervene unless judicial error affects domestic interests, so managers and investors would rather face slow learning judges in their home country.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- EU level intervention being slow and therefore a weak deterrent

**Source quote.**

> National legislatures could intervene and change corporate law, but unless judicial error affects domestic interests, legislatures are unlikely to do so. Managers and investors thus would probably prefer to confront slow learning judges in their home country.

**From.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, *Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro* (2004), D.II.4 Incomplete Information About the Learning Process for Judges, page 35

**Cite as.** Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kirchner%20et%20al.%20-%202004%20-%20Regulatory%20Competition%20in%20EU%20Corporate%20Law%20after%20Inspire%20Art%20Unbundling%20Delaware%27s%20Product%20for%20Euro.pdf

**Failure mode.** absent-corrective-mechanism  (family: enforcement-gap)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** error-correction, legislative-oversight, judicial-learning, home-country-bias

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