# kaal:claim:6192998-017

**Claim.** When foundational work earns no downstream credit, the contributor's optimal strategy shifts to hoarding knowledge or publishing only when full value can be captured personally.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reputation systems without citation based attribution

**Source quote.**

> Economic consequence: Alice has no incentive to share insights that others can build on. Optimal strategy becomes hoarding knowledge or publishing only when you can capture full value yourself.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution* (2026), III.A. The Citation Paradox: Missing Knowledge Attribution, page 17

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6192998

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `b04292561ee041e0c9eaa7eca28a410ed440e76a95743a539361a3f76c97f2b3` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Domain-Specific%20Reputation%20Systems%20From%20Binary%20Validation%20to%20Citation-Weighted%20Knowledge%20Attribution.pdf

**Failure mode.** knowledge-hoarding  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** citation-and-knowledge, securities-law, institutional-design, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** knowledge-hoarding, anticommons, incentives, citation-paradox, knowledge-sharing

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.