# kaal:claim:6269518-001

**Claim.** Under existing citation-weighted reputation formulations, rational agents face a direct financial disincentive to cite prior contributions, because PageRank-derived value allocation transfers economic reward from the citing agent to the cited agent.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- citation-weighted value allocation through PageRank-derived mechanisms
- agents are rational and self interested

**Source quote.**

> Under existing formulations, rational agents face a direct financial disincentive to cite prior contributions, as citation-weighted value allocation through PageRank-derived mechanisms transfers economic reward from the citing agent to the cited agent.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance* (2026), Abstract, page 1

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Citation%20Honesty%20Mechanisms%20in%20Weighted%20Directed%20Acyclic%20Graph%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** under-citation incentive  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** citation-and-knowledge, ai-and-agents, risk-and-incentives, reputation, dao, governance-design

**Keywords.** under-citation, pagerank, incentive-misalignment, reputation-systems, dao-governance

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-021

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.