# kaal:claim:6269518-012

**Claim.** Leaching parameters can and should be calibrated to balance competing incentives, rewarding honest attribution while retaining enough skin in the game to deter frivolous or strategic references.

**Type.** normative  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> The insight from the WDAG framework is that leaching parameters can and should be calibrated to balance competing incentives. Thus, rewarding honest attribution while maintaining sufficient skin-in-the-game to prevent frivolous or strategic references.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance* (2026), II.C. Connection to WDAG Reference Weights, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Citation%20Honesty%20Mechanisms%20in%20Weighted%20Directed%20Acyclic%20Graph%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, governance-design

**Keywords.** leaching-parameter, incentive-calibration, wdag, governance-design

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