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 "text": "Because policing protocol deviants is expensive, it is individually more efficient to assume others comply and skip policing, which yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which eventually fewer than half of members police and the system can be gamed.",
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 "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
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