# kaal:claim:6269518-040

**Claim.** Because the analysis rests on the Nash equilibrium concept, it does not rule out coordinated under-citation among colluding groups; coalition-proof equilibrium analysis is needed to address that possibility.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- groups of agents able to coordinate citation strategies

**Source quote.**

> Fourth, the analysis has focused on the Nash equilibrium concept. Coalition-proof equilibrium analysis would address the possibility of coordinated under-citation among groups of colluding agents.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance* (2026), VI.C. Limitations and Future Work, page 17

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Citation%20Honesty%20Mechanisms%20in%20Weighted%20Directed%20Acyclic%20Graph%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** collusive under-citation unaddressed  (family: research-design-limitation)

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** collusion, coalition-proof-equilibrium, limitations, game-theory

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.