# kaal:claim:6421319-028

**Claim.** Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- supported by algorithmic collusion research in pricing games, Bertrand duopoly experiments, and financial trading

**Source quote.**

> Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy. It becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *The Collapse of Scarcity Economics* (2026), VI.C. Nash's Equilibrium: From Anthropocentric Relic to Algorithmic Collusion Risk, page 25

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `0f4f68e56ee48bb8b2d73d3ab7fd96fa572e76c195694ffa740360704c1b172d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20The%20Collapse%20of%20Scarcity%20Economics.pdf

**Failure mode.** Algorithmic Collusion Risk  (family: ai-oversight-and-alignment-gap)

**Topics.** economics, reputation

**Keywords.** nash-equilibrium, algorithmic-collusion, game-theory, antitrust

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.