# kaal:claim:6607458-033

**Claim.** Without a verification record accessible to counterparties, generative markets suffer a generative-quality failure analogous to the lemons problem: counterparties price on the distribution of observed qualities, which systematically underprices high-quality generators.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- holds when the quality of a generative distribution is unobservable to counterparties

**Source quote.**

> The computative analog is a generative-quality failure: when the quality of a generative distribution is unobservable, counterparties price on the distribution of observed qualities, which systematically underprices high-quality generators.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance* (2026), IX.B. Reputation-Based Verification, page 25

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Computative%20Economics%20A%20Framework%20for%20Economic%20Analysis%20under%20Computational%20Abundance.pdf

**Failure mode.** Generative-Quality Failure  (family: information-asymmetry)

**Topics.** reputation

**Keywords.** lemons-problem, generative-quality-failure, reputation-infrastructure, adverse-selection

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.