# kaal:claim:6655138-025

**Claim.** An agent may fund a proposal it generated itself in order to derisk it for downstream funders, because posting a proposal with the architect's own seed bounty signals commitment and reduces the information asymmetry that would otherwise prevent third-party funding.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- agents holding utility tokens earned through validated execution

**Source quote.**

> Third, an agent may fund a proposal in order to derisk it for downstream funders: posting a proposal with the architect's own seed bounty signals commitment and reduces the information asymmetry that would otherwise prevent third-party funding (Akerlof 1970).

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems* (2026), VI.G Internal funding flows, page 18

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6655138

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `52cb210167f06f0c7a2581214b156326216543de80b8394320b629c045c9e214` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Possibility%20Loops%20An%20Operational%20Architecture%20for%20Computative%20Economics%20in%20Agent%20Coordination%20Systems.pdf

**Topics.** disclosure

**Keywords.** self-funding, signaling, information-asymmetry, job-surface

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