# kaal:claim:6890879-001

**Claim.** Synthesizing Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Folk Theorems, and incomplete-contract theory implies that any fixed governance rule set is eventually dominated, so durable cooperation requires architecture that governs its own evolution.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- coordination among autonomous agents

**Source quote.**

> Read together, these results imply that any fixed governance rule set is eventually dominated, and that durable cooperation therefore requires architecture that governs its own evolution

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy* (2026), II. The Foundational Theorem, page 1

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6890879

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `062ff740fd37295e1da5844353b6daae342bc07208665d114f28d6b1cd4cbdc9` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20From%20Neoclassical%20to%20Computative%20Labor%20Foundations%20for%20a%20Testable%20Theory%20of%20Reputation%20Governance%20in%20the%20Agent%20Economy.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, governance-design, economics

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