kaal:claim:7260278-009

The substrate's additional move against the trilemma is architectural rather than algorithmic: reputation is earned only through staked participation in validation pools whose composition the attacker does not control, decays absent continued performance, and carries a non-zero exit cost, so the manufacture of identities buys entry into an iterated game that new identities systematically lose.

Source quote, verbatim
The substrate's additional move against the trilemma is architectural rather than algorithmic: reputation is earned only through staked participation in validation pools whose composition the attacker does not control, decays absent continued performance, and carries a non-zero exit cost, so the manufacture of identities buys entry into an iterated game that new identities systematically lose.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026), II.B. Staked validation, commit-reveal voting, and oracle design, p. 7
https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278

Holds when
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mechanismsupport: arguedreputationconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

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