# kaal:claim:7260278-040

**Claim.** The Folk Theorem is permissive: it establishes that cooperative equilibria exist under the engineered conditions, not that the population selects them.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the architecture is evaluated apart from empirical equilibrium selection

**Source quote.**

> The Folk Theorem is permissive: it establishes that cooperative equilibria exist under the engineered conditions, not that the population selects them.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate* (2026), IX.B. Non-Reliance and Limitations, page 18

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `d48801f279dba594e1f3e65d74d31f862261ada6428ea119f948e8d7cfee1db0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Paper%202%20-%20Architecture%20of%20the%20Agentic%20Reputation%20Substrate.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, risk-and-incentives, ai-and-agents

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.