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  "text": "Unanimity is a cascade-consistent quantity: unusually frequent unanimous verdicts are consistent with validators discounting private information in favor of perceived group consensus, but they do not uniquely identify the Banerjee and Bikhchandani-Hirshleifer-Welch mechanism, with Holmström’s free-riding equilibrium supplying the complementary reading that leaning on the apparent consensus is what costly evaluation effort converges to when its product is shared.",
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  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Empirical Evaluation of the Agentic Reputation Substrate: Deliberation, the Composition of Error, and the Registered Measurement of Agency Costs in a Controlled Multi-Model Cohort (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7261018",
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