# kaal:claim:7314479-039

**Claim.** Because provenance fields are minted by Core and never supplied by the tool, the tool remains low-trust and cannot forge its own provenance.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- core-mediated provenance in two-zone trust models

**Source quote.**

> Nothing needs to be surfaced to tools, which is important: the tool remains low-trust and cannot forge its own provenance, because it never supplies these fields.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Institutional Requirements for Sovereign Local Agent Runtimes* (2026), VIII. Engineering Contributions, Contribution 1, page 18

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Institutional Requirements for Sovereign Local Agent Runtimes (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7314479

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `debace24a155ae924a155b1fafe98856d98cf83689feff2f87a32f1c06171ce6` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Institutional%20Requirements%20for%20Sovereign%20Local%20Agent%20Runtimes.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, ai-and-agents

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