kaal:claim:7322599-014

Because unnoticed theft exits disguised as honest departure, release-clock discrimination helps only above a filing-coverage floor that rises as matches lengthen; with positive carry it exceeds one in the strict long-match limit, where no feasible filing rate produces a positive marginal escrow effect.

Source quote, verbatim

A necessary condition for the wedge to help at all is φ > 1 − λeA; the exact suﬀicient condition at the ideal corner is (10). As matches lengthen the filing requirement rises; with positive carry it exceeds one in the strict long-match limit, so no feasible filing rate produces a positive marginal escrow effect there.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026), 5 The filing floor and the release-clock wedge, Proposition 2, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

Holds when

release clocks that discriminate by claim status

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designeconomics

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