# kaal:claim:7322599-015

**Claim.** False freezes tax honest release value and worsen the release-clock wedge's own admission condition, so challenger bonds, standing rules, and other anti-griefing measures are design candidates whose effects require separate modeling.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- griefing priced within the model's composites

**Source quote.**

> False freezes are priced inside the same composites: they tax honest release value, relax the participation floor, and can help the exit constraint only in the badly filed regime. Within the model, griefing therefore worsens the wedge’s own admission condition; challenger bonds, standing rules, and other anti-griefing measures are design candidates whose effects require separate modeling.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets* (2026), 5 The filing floor and the release-clock wedge, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `130ee4e65fb79a9f3a96f6df22408b40c2de76e9ec8fc2bd1c68f0f6a7104333` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Refundable%20Stake%20Does%20Not%20Expand%20Deterrent%20Capacity%20in%20Long-Lived%20Delegation%20Collateral%2C%20Premia%2C%20and%20Pseudonymous%20Markets.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, governance-design, consensus-and-security

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