# kaal:claim:7322599-016

**Claim.** Every delegation-misconduct case is organized by two parameters: whether unsanctioned misconduct retains or ends the relationship, and whether the unsanctioned stake is recovered or captive.

**Type.** definitional  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the paper's two-by-two regime map

**Source quote.**

> Two parameters organize every case: whether unsanctioned misconduct retains the rela- tionship (in place) or ends it (exit), and whether the unsanctioned stake is recovered or captive.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets* (2026), 6 The regime map and the capacity prediction, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Refundable Stake Does Not Expand Deterrent Capacity in Long-Lived Delegation: Collateral, Premia, and Pseudonymous Markets (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7322599

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `130ee4e65fb79a9f3a96f6df22408b40c2de76e9ec8fc2bd1c68f0f6a7104333` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202026%20-%20Refundable%20Stake%20Does%20Not%20Expand%20Deterrent%20Capacity%20in%20Long-Lived%20Delegation%20Collateral%2C%20Premia%2C%20and%20Pseudonymous%20Markets.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, risk-and-incentives, economics

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